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Abstract
This paper provides a simple model of hierarchical education to study the politi-
cal determination of public education spending and its allocation between different 
tiers of education. The model integrates private education decisions by allowing par-
ents, who are differentiated according to income and human capital, to top up public 
expenditures with private transfers. We identify four groups of households with con-
flicting preferences over the the size of the public education budget and its alloca-
tion. In equilibrium, public education budget, private expenditures and expenditure 
allocation among different tiers of education, depend on which group of households 
is in power and on country-specific features such as income inequality and intergen-
erational persistence in education. By running a cluster analysis on 32 OECD coun-
tries, we seek to establish if distinctive ‘education regimes’, akin to those identified 
in the theoretical analysis, could be discerned. Our main finding is that a high inter-
generational persistence in education might foster the establishment of education 
regimes in which the size and the allocation of the public budget among different 
tiers of education prevent a stable and significant increase of the population gradua-
tion rate, thus plunging the country in a ‘low education’ trap.
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1 Introduction
Education expenditures, allocation between tiers of education and source of financ-
ing vary considerably over the world, even among OECD countries. These dif-
ferences have important consequences for the quality and equity of the education 
system.1
Table 2 (in Appendix 1) summarises differences in education expenditures, com-
position, and funding source by reporting average values over the period 2010–2017 
for 32 OECD countries.2In the period considered, spending on education as a share 
of GDP was, on average, slightly above 5%, varying from less than 4% (Czech 
Republic, Greece, Italy, Hungary and Slovakia) to more than 6% (Canada, Denmark, 
New Zealand, Norway, UK and USA).There is, however, great variability in the dis-
tribution of expenditures between tiers of education; countries such as the US, Chile 
and Canada allocate around 40% of education spending to the tertiary level while 
others (Greece, Slovenia and Italy) less than 25%.3 Regarding the source of financ-
ing, non-tertiary education is mainly public in most countries (90% on average), but 
private financing of tertiary education varies considerably across countries (33% on 
average, ranging from 4% in Finland to more than 60% in Chile, Japan, UK and 
USA). Looking at public spending, the greater share is allocated to non-tertiary edu-
cation, on average, 3.3% of GDP compared to 1% of GDP to tertiary education. To 
compare the allocation of public spending between tiers of education across coun-
tries, we have computed the ratio of a country’s public spending on tertiary to basic 
with the OECD average (see last column of Table 2). A value of the index greater 
(lower) than one indicates that the country’s public education spending is unbal-
anced towards tertiary (basic) education.
In this paper, we argue that countries’ differences in total public spending and 
its allocation between basic and tertiary education are the result of political deci-
sions involving groups with conflicting preferences. To study these preferences, we 
provide a simple model of hierarchical education that considers two dimensions of 
heterogeneity among agents: income and education.
Standard redistributive arguments suggest that the impact of income on prefer-
ences for public education spending should be negative.4 However, children from 
low socio-economic status have lower enrolment rates at increasing levels of educa-
tion and thus they benefit less from spending on tertiary education.5 This evidence 
has been explained by the role of parental income and education in the children’s 
1 Equity in education means that personal or social circumstances such as gender, ethnic origin or family 
background, are not obstacles to achieving educational potential (fairness) and that all individuals reach 
at least a basic minimum level of skills (inclusion) (OECD 2012).
2 We use the average to smooth out short run fluctuations. All the variables are taken from http:// stats. 
oecd. org/. We do not consider Luxemburg and Ireland; Luxemburg because it is an outlier in terms of 
GDP and Ireland because GDP is not a satisfactory measure of the country’s income, due to the large 
income out-flow (in 2015, Irish GDP was over 150% of Irish GNI).
3 We refer to primary and secondary education as K-12, non-tertiary, or basic.
4 Meltzer and Richard (1981).
5 See, among others, Doyle (2007).
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human-capital production function. Parents contribute directly by financing the 
purchase of ‘inputs’ in the production of children’s human capital, such as books 
and other education resources, so wealthier parents spend more on their children 
education. As for parental education, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992, 2003) argue 
that a sufficiently high elasticity of parental human capital in the learning technol-
ogy might be responsible for low intergenerational mobility in education. Along the 
same line, Cohen (1987) and Keane and Wolpin (2001) argue that class differential 
in education attainment might be due to the fact that more educated parents attribute 
greater importance to education and as a result children of highly educated parents 
put more effort during their schooling.6 In addition, class differential in education 
attainments might also derive from social status differences in the ‘take-up’ of avail-
able opportunities.7
Another factor, related to the socioeconomic status of the household, that might 
affect children’s probability of enrolling in higher education, is the prospect of being 
allocated into high skill jobs. If children from disadvantaged households anticipate 
that they have lower chances of being employed into better paying jobs, they per-
ceive lower benefit from higher education (see Bernasconi and Profeta 2012; Grad-
stein 2019). In countries where education-based meritocracy is low, we therefore 
expect that parents from lower socioeconomic status tend to attach less importance 
to education.8 The same argument applies to the social inclusiveness of the educa-
tion system.9 In education systems featuring low inclusiveness, children’s education 
attainments strongly depend on social background. This means that children from 
disadvantaged environments do not entirely reap the advantages of public funding 
of higher education; thus, we expect these households to be less in favour of tertiary 
education spending.10
Aiming to capture the above features, which we believe shape individual prefer-
ences for public education budget and for its allocation between different stages of 
education, we develop a simple model of hierarchical education. The model inte-
grates public expenditure with private education decisions, by allowing parents to 
top up public expenditure in advanced education with private transfers. Households 
consist of one parent and one child. Parents, who are differentiated according to an 
exogenously given level of human capital and income, care about household’s con-
sumption and their children’s human capital. Children get educated in a hierarchi-
cal schooling system that features two levels of education: the lower level (K-12) 
6 Kirchsteiger and Sebald (2010) develop an OLG model in which parents’ influence shapes children’s 
attitudes to education.
7 In this respect Goldthorpe (2003) writes -citing research in Sweden and Britain—that among children 
of average ability those from higher salaried class origin are almost twice as likely to opt for academic 
courses as those from working class origins.
8 Bowles and Gintis (2000), Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2010).
9 Features of an inclusive education system are a high degree of comprehensiveness of programs, a rela-
tively even standard of education, a low percentage of private schools, and few possibilities for schools 
to select their pupils. By contrast, low inclusiveness features include formal differentiation (students are 
separated by ability through early tracking) and/or informal differentiation (socioeconomic segregation 
among schools).
10 See, among others, Busemeyer (2012).
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is mandatory and funded exclusively by the government; the higher level (tertiary 
education), whose access is not universal, is publicly funded, although affluent par-
ents can top up with private transfers. We assume that access to tertiary education 
depends on parental human capital. The degree of such dependence—to which here-
after we refer as intergenerational persistence in education- is determined by a vari-
ety of elements which in part can be country-specific.Finally, we assume that the 
public budget is entirely allocated to education and it is financed through income tax 
collection.
We identify four groups of households with conflicting preferences over the the 
size of the public education budget and its allocation. The intensity of the conflict 
among the groups is related to income inequality and to the degree of intergenera-
tional persistence in education.
In equilibrium, the size of the budget allocated to education (and therefore the 
income tax) and the expenditure allocation among different tiers of education, 
depend on which group of households is in power and on country-specific features 
such as income inequality and the intergenerational persistence in education. We 
show that if the interests of low-educated households prevail, the equilibrium fea-
tures a low level of public spending, unbalanced towards basic education, the more 
so the higher is the intergenerational persistence in education. By contrast, if the 
interests that predominate are those of highly educated households, whose income is 
lower than mean income, then, in equilibrium, public spending is relatively high. In 
both cases, the size of private expenditure in tertiary education is positively related 
to income inequality. Finally, if the political power is in the hands of rich and well-
educated households, the equilibrium is similar to the one associated to the predomi-
nance of low-educated agents, and it is characterised by low public spending, unbal-
anced towards basic education, while advanced education is mainly financed by 
private sources.11 If, instead, private options were not available, or not sufficiently 
developed, rich and well-educated households would support a relatively high pub-
lic spending, unbalanced towards tertiary education.
After conceptualising different political equilibria, we turn to the data to explore 
similarities and differences between education systems in 32 OECD countries. Our 
aim is to establish if distinctive ‘education regimes’, akin to those identified in the 
theoretical analysis, could be discerned. To this purpose, we run a cluster analysis 
based on four key dimensions: inequality in the distribution of income; intergenera-
tional persistence in education; share of graduates in the adult population; educa-
tion expenditure (private and public) and its composition between tiers. Five clusters 
emerge from the analysis and narratives of one country exemplifying each cluster 
are presented. To each of these exemplifying countries, we associate a political equi-
librium identified in the theoretical analysis. Our main finding is that a high inter-
generational persistence in education might foster the establishment of education 
regimes in which the size and the allocation of the public budget among different 
11 This is consistent with a well-established result in the literature: when private options for advanced 
education are available, the interests of low and high social status households might converge and an 
"ends-against-the-middle" type of equilibrium is likely to be observed (Epple and Romano 1996).
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tiers of education prevent a stable and significant increase in educational upward 
mobility, thus plunging the country in a ‘low education’ trap.
The contribution of this paper is relevant for political and theoretical reasons. On 
the political side, given the important involvement of governments in the education 
sector, understanding the political economy constraints of public education policy 
is crucial. Theoretically, our paper helps explaining the documented differences in 
education expenditures across OECD countries and why some countries, like Italy, 
seem to remain stuck in a ‘low education’ trap.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 3 illustrates the theoretical model. Section 4 contains the cluster analy-
sis. Section 5 concludes and highlights some policy implications.
2  Related Literature
This paper relates to the theoretical literature on the political economy of educa-
tion funding (Glomm et  al. 2011). Investigating the political economy constraints 
of public education policy is crucial to understand the variation of public educa-
tion expenditures across countries. The literature on education mainly treats basic 
and tertiary education symmetrically, or simply assumes a single type of education. 
More recently, some contributions have considered the hierarchical nature of educa-
tion through an explicit two-stage technology and have analysed the preferences for 
the two tiers of education in a political economy perspective (Blankenau et al. 2007; 
Viaene and Zilcha 2013; Naito and Nishida 2017).12 Our contribution is related to 
this strand of the literature. In these models, the level of human capital produced in 
the last stage of education is either fixed or depends on the amount of government 
expenditure. In the first case, the government can only choose to subsidize part of 
the cost of higher education, thus affecting its private cost but not its quality (that 
in these models is exogenous). By contrast, in our contribution, the human capital 
produced in the last stage of education depends on privately and publicly provided 
(monetary) inputs, which justifies our assumption of perfect substitutability.13 Spe-
cifically, we assume that parents can top up public expenditure in advanced educa-
tion with private transfers. Another important difference between our contribution 
and the bulk of the literature on the political economy of public education spending 
is that we analyse a two-dimensional political economy model and consider income 
and human capital as two different dimensions of heterogeneity.14Thus, conflicting 
12 Others have focused on how the allocation of resources in education affects growth (see, among oth-
ers, Blankenau 2005; Arcalean and Schiopu 2010).
13 The literature has not reached a consensus regarding the degree of substitutability between private and 
public inputs in the various stages of education. While arguments for complementarity are quite strong 
for early stages of education (Nordblom 2003), the same arguments are less compelling for tertiary edu-
cation, as reviewed by Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2005).
14 We justify this assumption by referring to empirical evidence. By working with OECD survey data, 
Di Gioacchino et  al. (2019) find that the correlation between individual income and human capital is 
positive but below 0.5.
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interests are not only between rich and poor families over the size of the public edu-
cation budget, but also between highly educated families who enrol their children 
in university and those who do not. In this framework, we explicitly model parti-
san preferences for public spending in basic and tertiary education and investigate 
the impact of countries’ features such as income inequality and the intergenerational 
persistence in education on these preferences. We are thus able to identify different 
political equilibria and relate them to different ‘education regimes’.
This paper is also broadly related to the literature that, following a comparative 
approach, studies the typologies of welfare states and the ‘varieties of capitalism’. 
Research in this field has focused on how welfare regimes might be conceptualised, 
concentrating on social transfer payments as opposed to services. However, the lat-
ter, and in particular education, are a fundamental component of the welfare state. 
This paper adds to this literature by focusing on how different ‘education regimes’ 
might be rationalised. Along this line of research, West and Nikolai (2013) have 
addressed the relationship between ‘education regimes’ and the welfare state.15 They 
have clustered 14 OECD countries (all European apart from US) according to edu-
cation spending variables and other variables related to the characteristics of the 
education system. They have identified four clusters or ‘education regimes’, which 
roughly overlap with the European welfare regimes identified by Esping-Andersen 
(1990) and subsequent studies (Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, Continental and Mediterra-
nean).16 By contrast, we run a cluster analysis over 32 OECD countries consider-
ing, in addition to education spending variables, also income inequality, intergenera-
tional education persistence, and the share of graduates in the adult population. We 
identify five clusters. Two of them—the one including Nordic European countries 
and that including mostly English-speaking countries—detect ‘education regimes’ 
which ‘overlap’ with the welfare regimes, respectively Social-Democratic and Lib-
eral, identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). However, we are not able to recognise, 
among European countries, the Continental and Mediterranean clusters. Rather, 
we clearly single out a cluster of low spending countries (Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic and Greece) whose ‘education regimes’ recall the political equilib-
rium in which the interests of low-educated households prevail. This cluster is char-
acterised by high values of intergenerational persistence in education. It is worth 
noting that this feature is shared with another clear-cut cluster identified by our 
analysis: the one including three emerging countries (Turkey, Mexico and Chile), 
though, in this case, the ‘education regime’ features a higher level of public spend-
ing biased towards tertiary education. Given the high intergenerational persistence 
in education, this last ‘education regime’ appears to favour the interests of rich and 
well-educated households, whose offspring are more likely to reap the benefits of 
15 A similar analysis has been carried out by Willemse and de Beer (2012). They have applied the com-
parative approach to higher education, aiming at uncovering the original three clusters identified by Esp-
ing-Andersen’s and concluded that it is not clear that the concepts of decommodification and stratifica-
tion, proposed by Esping-Andersen’s analysis of welfare state, suffice to capture the characteristics of 
higher education regimes.
16 See Arts and Gelissen (2002) for a survey. The comparative approach has been also used by Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and subsequent literature to explain the varieties of capitalism.
1 3
Intergenerational Upward (Im)mobility and Political Support…
public education spending biased towards tertiary education. Our expectation is that 
in both ‘education regimes’ the size of the public education budget and its alloca-
tion between different tiers will prevent a stable and significant increase of educa-
tional upward mobility.
3  The Model
In the economy, there is a continuum of households of measure one; this implies 
that per capita values coincide with total values. A household consists of one parent 
and one child. Parents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: income and human 
capital. Let indexes j and i identify, respectively, parent’s income and education. 
Income yj , is distributed in the parent population according to a given distribution 
function with mean y. Parent’s human capital can take two values: i = G, if the par-
ent has graduated from university, and i = NG if the parent has not obtained a univer-
sity degree. Parents maximise an expected utility function defined over household 
consumption and human capital accumulated by the offspring.
Children’s human capital depends on public and private expenditures on educa-
tion.17 Children are educated in a hierarchical schooling system in which basic edu-
cation might be followed by tertiary education. Basic education is publicly financed, 
while tertiary education is the result of public spending and parents’ educational 
transfer.
Human capital formation is modelled as a two-stage process. The first stage 
(basic education)—corresponding to primary and secondary education—is manda-
tory. We denote by B public expenditures in basic education. Access to the second 
stage (tertiary education) requires the successful completion of basic education. 
Public tertiary education spending is denoted by T and it is the same for all children 
accessing university. Each parent can top up public tertiary expenditure with private 
expenditure Tij where the indexes i and j identify, respectively, parent’s education 
and income.18
Each child accumulates human capital according to the following production 
function:
Note that we allow for the possibility that the effectiveness of the two tiers of 
education differ and, by taking the elasticity of human capital w.r.t tertiary educa-
tion spending as numeraire,  measures the benefits of basic education relative to 
hij =
{
B
(
Tij + T
)
if tertiary education is completed
B otherwise
17 Since our focus is on the role of household social status, we assume all children to be alike. Adding 
children’s heterogeneity in innate abilities or talent would not change preferences, on average, if innate 
talent were randomly distributed among households.
18 The idea is that parents might make up for public funding deemed insufficient by adding private 
expenditures. For example, paying for a private Master degree after a public BA or augmenting ERAS-
MUS public funding.
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tertiary. If higher education spending is more effective than basic education spend-
ing, then 0 < 𝛼 < 1.
The probability of entering university is not the same for all children. We assume 
that children whose parent has a university degree access university with probability 
pG , while, if the parent has not graduated from university, this probability is pNG , 
with 0 < pNG < pG < 1.19
The ratio pG
pNG
 can be interpreted as an indicator of the intergenerational persis-
tence in education: the closer this ratio is to one, the less access to tertiary education 
depends on parents’ education.
We assume that human capital acquisition in higher education depends on total 
public spending regardless of the number of advanced students. Indeed, empirical 
studies show that class size has little effect on students’ achievements in higher edu-
cation (Naito and Nishida 2017). Moreover, there is a wide consensus that there are 
considerable economies of scale in the production of teaching and research at ter-
tiary level, even larger in the production of supportive services, like libraries and 
administrative services.20
Total public education expenditures are financed by a proportional income tax 
(  ), thus the government budget constraint can be written as:
where y is the average income in the parents’ population.
We assume that the household utility function is logarithmic in consumption and 
child’s human capital, with the parameter   measuring parent’s altruism21:
Utility is maximised under the household budget constraint and the non-negativ-
ity constraints:
In Appendix 2, we find the household optimal choices of consumption and pri-
vate investment in tertiary education (c∗
ij
, T∗
ij
) . In case of an interior solution ( Tij > 0),
(1)B + T = y
(2)Uij = lncij + lnhij
(3)cij + Tij = (1 − )yj
(4)Tij, cij ≥ 0
19 We are aware that, as shown by the empirical evidence, these probabilities also depend on parent’s 
income. We omit this aspect in the model, but we recognise this dependence in the discussion of our 
results.
20 See Brinkman and Leslie (1986), Cohn et al. (1989) and de Groot et al. (1991) for universities cost 
evaluation in the US and Worthington and Higgs (2011), Johnes and Schwarzenberger (2011) for recent 
applications to other countries. In a previous version of this paper, we computed political preferences 
assuming constant return to scale in tertiary education and thus including the participation rate in the 
budget constraint. Qualitative results do not change.
21 This is a standard assumption in the literature; see, among others, Viaene and Zilcha (2013) and Ber-
nasconi and Profeta (2012).
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Two results are worth noting: first, as income increases, private expenditure in 
(tertiary) education rises; second, graduate parents spend more than non-graduate 
parents do.
3.1  Preferences for Public Education and Political Equilibrium
To derive preferences for public education expenditures, write the household indi-
rect utility as a function of the Government’s choice variables22:
Substituting the optimal choices of consumption and private investment in ter-
tiary education (c∗
ij
, T∗
ij
) , in Appendix 2, we obtain households’ policy preferences, 
which are shown in the table below.
Table 1 summarises demand for public education spending by households’ socio-
economic status. If education policy is interpreted as the (equilibrium) result of an 
electoral competition then, the policy outcome depends on which group is the most 
powerful, i.e. on the identity of the pivotal voter. In our framework, there are four 
possible outcomes, each characterised by the prevalence of one group of house-
holds. In what follows, we consider each one of them and discuss the likelihood of 
its occurrence.
Beforehand, note that the equilibrium share of basic education, which is obtained 
residually 
(
B∗
y
= ∗ −
T∗
y
)
 , increases with the elasticity of human capital w.r.t to 
basic education (  ), which is a measure of the benefits from basic education. Simi-
larly, the equilibrium share of tertiary education, if positive, increases with the prob-
ability to enter university ( pi) . These parameters are, at least partially, country-spe-
cific being related to the productive and social structure of the economy.
First, consider the case in which the pivotal voter’s income is below average 
income; namely, the two outcomes in the first column of Table 1.23 Comparing these 
two outcomes, we see that if pG = pNG they coincide. Otherwise, total public edu-
cation spending and the share of tertiary education are higher if households with 
graduate parents prevail (i.e. if the equilibrium is the one in the second row).24 This 
c∗
ij
=
(1 − )yj + T
1 + pi
T∗
ij
=
pi(1 − )yj − T
1 + pi
(5)Wij(, T) = lnc∗ij + ln(y − T) + pijln
(
T∗
ij
+ T
)
23 This would probably be the case in a majority voting with no abstention.
24 Note also, that the share of tertiary education increases more than total public education when the 
probability to access higher education increases, i.e. 
𝜕
T
y
𝜕pi
>
𝜕𝜏
𝜕pi
> 0
22 Given its budget constraints, the Government can choose only two variables.
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is more likely to happen if the share of graduates in the adult population is high. 
This is summarised in the following results.
Result 1 If the pivotal voter’s income is lower than mean income, then total public 
spending and the tertiary share are higher if the pivotal voter is a graduate.
Result 2 If the pivotal voter’s income is lower than mean income, then, public edu-
cation spending is unbalanced towards tertiary (basic) education if pi > 𝛼 (if pi < 𝛼
).
Note also that in these equilibria, low-income households (i.e. those with yj < y ) 
do not invest in private education, while high-income households spend an amount 
T∗
ij
=
pi(yj−y)
(pi++
1

)(1+pi)
 on tertiary education (see Appendix 2).
Next consider a setting in which the pivotal voter’s income is above average 
income. In this case, the outcome would be one of the two equilibria shown in the 
second column of Table 1. We have the following
Result 3 If the pivotal voter is rich, then total public spending is low and unbal-
anced towards basic education.
In these equilibria, there is no public tertiary education and each household is 
willing to invest privately in tertiary education an amount T∗
ij
=
pi(1−)yj
1+pi
 (see 
Appendix 2).
Comparing the two equilibria in the second column, we see that total public 
education spending is even lower if households with graduate parents prevail. The 
reason is that high-income households prefer a low public budget, devoted to basic 
education, and privately invest in tertiary education, the more so the higher is their 
probability to enter tertiary education ( pi).
In each of the above equilibria, private spending increases with the income share 
of the rich. Thus, our model predicts a positive relationship between income ine-
quality and private education spending. This is summarised in the following results.
Result 4 Private spending in tertiary education increases with income inequality.
Finally, suppose that there is no possibility to top up public education expendi-
ture with private expenditures. This could happen if, for example, there are too few 
potential students and, due to high fixed costs, it is not convenient to start a for-profit 
university. In this case, preferences are as shown in the first column of Table 1 for all 
households, independently of their income. This suggests that if the rich do not have 
the opportunity to substitute public education with private education, they would 
support public spending.
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Result 5 If there is no private tertiary education, then (also) the rich support ter-
tiary public education. In this case, if the pivotal voter is rich and well educated and 
if pG > 𝛼, spending is unbalanced towards tertiary education.
To interpret countries’ public education spending and its composition as the out-
come of a political equilibrium, in the next section, we perform a cluster analysis for 
OECD countries and use the results of our model to interpret the clusters.
4  Cluster Analysis
In this section, we report the result of a cluster analysis performed over 32 OECD 
countries. To cluster the countries, we use the following education expenditure vari-
ables (averaged over the period 2010–2017)25: public tertiary (TerPub), public basic 
(BasPub), total private (TotPriv) and total public (TotPub), all computed as share of 
GDP. Furthermore, we consider income inequality, an index of the intergenerational 
persistence in education and the share of graduates in the population.In our model 
income inequality is positively related to private education spending, while the index 
of intergenerational persistence in education proxies the gap between the probability 
of entering university of children from low social status relative to children from 
high social status. More precisely, a higher intergenerational educational persistence 
is associated with lower  pNG relative to pG . Finally, we consider the share of gradu-
ates and we expect that the higher is this share, the higher is the graduates’ political 
weight and therefore the higher the probability that their interest would prevail in 
equilibrium. To measure income inequality, we use the GINI index of disposable 
income; to assess the intergenerational persistence in education, we take the variable 
COR, which measures the correlation between the years spent in education by par-
ents and the years spent by the child; higher COR indicates higher intergenerational 
persistence in education.26 The SHARE of graduates in the adult population refers 
Table 1  Households’ policy preferences for tertiary and total public education, as shares of GDP
Low-income ( yj < y) High-income ( yj ≥ y)
Non-graduated parents (i = NG) T∗
y
=
pNG
pNG++
1

∗ =
pNG+
pNG++1∕
T∗
y
= 0
∗ =

pNG++1∕
Graduated parents (i = G) T∗
y
=
pG
pG++
1

∗ =
pG+
pG++1∕
T∗
y
= 0
∗ =

pG++1∕
26 COR measures intergenerational persistence in education using Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
between the years of education of parents and children. We use data from 2018 Global Database on Inter-
generational Mobility of the World Bank (GDIM 2018) for the 1980’s cohort. The 1980 cohort refers to 
the generation born between 1980 and 1989 and their parents. For parents’ educational attainment, we 
take the subpopulation “max”, which represents the greatest available values among parents. For chil-
25 The original variables used in the analyses are reported in the appendix (see Table 2).
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to the population aged 25–64 who have completed tertiary education. To limit the 
problem of reverse causality and to strengthen our interpretation of the results in 
terms of the effects of COR, GINI and SHARE on the demand for public and private 
education, we consider values of GINI, COR and SHARE that precede the observed 
values of education expenditures (for GINI and SHARE, we take the 2010 values 
and for COR, we refer to the 1980 cohort).27
To perform the cluster analysis, we use the standardised values of the seven vari-
ables (see Table 4 in Appendix 3). The standardisation allows each variable to con-
tribute equally to the definition of the clusters by eliminating distortions coming 
from the fact that variables with a large range are given more weight in defining a 
cluster solution than those with a small range (Afifi et al. 2019).
We first run a principal component analysis on the standardised variables. As 
shown in Table 5 in Appendix 3, the first three components explain 85% of the vari-
ance. Each component captures a specific dimension of the variability in the data 
set. The first component (PC1) has a large positive association with TotPub and it is 
negatively correlated with GINI and COR. We interpret this component as captur-
ing the ‘egalitarian society’ dimension: a country scoring high in this dimension 
exhibits a low redistributive conflict, a quite mobile society (low intergenerational 
persistence in education) and high public spending. The second component (PC2) 
has a large positive association with TotPriv, GINI and SHARE. We interpret this 
component as capturing the ‘market-based society’ dimension: a country scoring 
high in this dimension exhibits a strong redistributive conflict, high private educa-
tion expenditure and low public spending, especially in the tertiary segment. The 
third component (PC3) is positively correlated with GINI, COR and TerPub. We 
interpret this component as capturing the ‘élitarian society’ dimension: high values 
along this dimension indicate high income inequality, high intergenerational persis-
tence in education and a public spending biased towards tertiary education. We call 
it ‘élitarian’ because a country scoring high in this dimension uses public spending 
in education mainly to benefit the privileged élite.
The position of each country along the three principal components (Fig. 1)28 and 
the hierarchical tree-diagram (Fig. 2), resulting from the cluster analysis based on 
these principal components, identify five groups of countries at the dissimilarity 
level shown by the red line.2930
Footnote 26 (continued)
dren’s educational attainment, we consider “all” the respondents who belong to the cohort. Further infor-
mation is available on the Description of Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (GDIM 2018).
27 Table 3, in Appendix 3 reports the value of these variables for each country.
28 Countries’ scores for the three components are reported in Table 6, in Appendix3.
29 A Ward’s linkage clustering with Euclidean distance as a dissimilarity measure is adopted. The verti-
cal axis of the dendrogram represents the distance or dissimilarity between clusters. The horizontal axis 
represents the countries and clusters. The purpose is to obtain few groups, each containing elements 
that are similar among themselves and dissimilar to elements belonging to other groups. In practice, the 
choice on the number of groups is the choice of the vertical level at which to cut the tree.
30 The same dendrogram is obtained by performing a cluster analysis using the seven original standard-
ised variables instead of the three principal components.
1 3
Intergenerational Upward (Im)mobility and Political Support…
Group 1 (Austria, Belgium, Island, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland) contains 
countries that score very high in the first component (‘egalitarian society’ dimen-
sion) and have a negative or very low score in the second and in the third compo-
nents (‘market-based society’ and ‘élitarian society’ dimensions). In these countries, 
education expenditures are high in both education tiers and almost entirely pub-
licly funded; the correlation between parents and children’s years of education is 
low (apart from Austria and Belgium) and there is a high share of graduates in the 
population. These societies display a low level of redistributive conflict (low income 
inequality), and a high degree of social mobility (low intergenerational persistence 
in education). These facts are consistent with a political equilibrium in which public 
spending in education is high and education funding from private sources is insig-
nificant. The identity of the pivotal voter is not important given the low level of 
conflicts, although the high share of graduates in the adult population strengthen the 
probability that the pivotal voter be highly educated and explains the bias towards 
public spending in tertiary education. This ‘low conflict’ equilibrium is well suited 
to describe the situation observed in Denmark where the GINI index is 0.25, COR 
is 0.17 and the SHARE of graduates in the adult population is 33% (see Table 4). 
Public education spending in Denmark is 6.13% of GDP. Private spending is almost 
insignificant (0.19%) and public expenditure is biased towards tertiary education 
(our tertiary bias index scores 1.18).31
Group 2 (Australia, UK, Israel, USA, Canada, New Zealand, Japan) contains 
countries characterised by high values of the second component (‘market-based 
society’ dimension). In these countries, education expenditures are high, but a rel-
evant share of tertiary education spending is financed by private funds. As an exam-
ple of this group, consider the US. In the US, a high share of graduates (42%) boosts 
demand for education and accordingly, total spending is high. Income inequality 
is relatively high (the GINI index is 0.38) and, in line with our model’s results, a 
relevant share of education is privately funded (1.98% of GDP). This expenditure 
is concentrated at the tertiary level. Public spending in education is relatively low 
(4.3% of GDP) and unbalanced towards basic education (our tertiary bias index 
scores 0.93). This can be taken as an example of an ‘ends-against-the-middle’ type 
of equilibrium. When private options for advanced education are available, the inter-
ests of low and high social status households might converge. The political equilib-
rium in this case features low public spending, unbalanced towards basic education, 
with a high share of advanced education financed by private sources.
Group 3 (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece, Italy, Hungary) includes countries 
with negative scores along all the three dimensions. These countries spend on edu-
cation a small share of their GDP, mainly concentrated on basic education. They are 
all characterised by a high COR value indicating a high intergenerational persistence 
in education. In Italy, for example, the average share of GDP devoted to education in 
the period 2010–2017 is 3.85% (3.4% from public funding), one of the lowest value 
among OECD countries; education spending is mainly public, and it is unbalanced 
towards basic education (our tertiary bias index scores 0.68). According to our 
31 See Table 2 in Appendix 1.
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model, low spending on both education tiers should be the outcome if the pivotal 
voter is non-graduate and if the intergenerational persistence in education is high. 
Indeed, in Italy, children’s access to tertiary education is highly dependent on par-
ents’ education (COR = 0.45) and the share of graduates in the population in 2010 
Fig. 1  Countries’ position in the three-dimensional space (PC1, PC2, PC3)
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Fig. 2  Dendrogram
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was the lowest among OECD countries (14.8%), consistent with the hypothesis that 
the pivotal voter represents the interest of the non-graduated population.
Group 4 (Chile, Mexico, Turkey) contains countries that score high in the third 
component ‘élitarian society’ dimension) and very low in the first component (‘egal-
itarian society’ dimension). As an example of this group, we consider Turkey.32 In 
the early 2000s, Turkey was among low spending countries, but, in the last decade, 
the country seems to have undergone a rapid change; public spending on education 
as a share of GDP increased by 24% between 2010 and 2017 (mostly concentrated 
on tertiary education), bringing Turkey, for the first time, above the OECD aver-
age (5.4% in Turkey in 2017 compared to the OECD average of 4.9%).33 Income 
inequality is high (GINI = 0.42) as it is the intergenerational persistence in education 
(COR = 0.51). Public education spending is unbalanced towards tertiary education 
(our tertiary bias index scores 1.67). In a context of high income inequality and high 
intergenerational persistence in education, public spending in education is regres-
sive rather than progressive.34 The interests represented are therefore those of a rich 
and well-educated élite. Thus, we interpret Turkey’s situation as the equilibrium out-
come obtained when the political power is in the hands of the rich and well edu-
cated, but a private supply of tertiary education is absent or not yet fully developed.
Finally, group 5 contains countries that apparently are quite different: Central 
European (The Netherlands and Deutschland), Eastern European (Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia) and Mediterranean (Portugal, Spain, France). They all present 
a negative score in the second component, consistent with the observation that in 
these countries education is mainly public. The absolute value of the score along the 
two other dimensions is always quite small suggesting that these countries are less 
egalitarian than countries in group one, although definitely not élitarian. Excluding 
Portugal, the SHARE of graduates in 2010 was similar to countries in group 1, but 
the GINI index was relatively higher. The COR value was around the OECD average 
for most of the countries in the group. As exemplifying country, we take France. In 
terms of average total spending, over the period considered the proportion of French 
GDP allocated to education was slightly above the OECD average (5.2% versus 
5.1%). Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP was above the OECD average 
(4.6% of GDP versus 4.3%) and balanced between the two education tiers (our ter-
tiary bias index scores 1.06). The share of GDP allocated to private expenditure was 
instead below the average (0.6% versus 0.8%). The GINI index (0.30%), COR (0.39) 
and SHARE (29%) are in line with the OECD average. We interpret this outcome as 
a political equilibrium similar to the one in Denmark, but less extreme. The political 
32 According to the World Bank’s classification – based on Gross National Income per capita—Turkey 
belongs to the upper-middle income group (https:// datah elpde sk. world bank. org/ knowl edgeb ase/ artic les/ 
906519- world- bank- count ry- and- lendi ng- groups).
33 If one looks at spending per student, which also accounts for the demographic structure of the popula-
tion, Turkey’s education expenditure in 2017 is still below OECD average.
34 Although in 2012, Turkey has approved a reform, which, among others, has increased compulsory 
education from 8 to 12 years, and although the number of students in tertiary education has increased 
substantially, access to higher levels of tertiary education and to prestigious universities is still a privilege 
(Gok 2016).
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conflict along the income and the education dimensions, measured respectively by 
the GINI index and COR, are higher relative to Denmark. Also, the share of gradu-
ates in the French population is lower than in the Danish population. The observed 
equilibrium is consistent with a low-educated and low-income pivotal voter. The 
higher public education expenditure observed, especially in the tertiary level, is con-
sistent with a COR index remarkably lower than in countries of Group 3. French 
society appears more mobile than the Italian, and we argue that this explains the 
greater demand for education in France.
4.1  Discussion and Policy Implication: Italy
Italy is somehow a puzzle. Notwithstanding its tradition and its level of develop-
ment, it spends very little on education, particularly at the advanced level. Several 
reasons can be put forward to explain such situation; here we highlight the role 
played by the intergenerational persistence in education. In this respect, it is interest-
ing to compare Italy to Portugal. In the last decade, in Portugal the share of young 
adults (25–34  years old) who have attained a tertiary education has increased by 
fifty percent reaching 37.4% in 2019.35 By comparison, in Italy, where the share of 
graduates in the population was similar to Portugal in 2010 (14.8%), the share of 
graduates in the young population in 2019 is only 27.7%. Comparing overall educa-
tion expenditures in the two countries, reveals that average total education expendi-
ture in the period 2010–2017 in Portugal was 5.3% of GDP (4.3% from public fund-
ing) while in Italy it amounted to 3.9% of GDP (3.4% from public funding). In the 
last two decades, the most dynamic component of education expenditures in Por-
tugal has been tertiary education, which was below 1% of GDP in 2000 and it has 
increased by more than 30% since then, reaching 1.3% of GDP in 2019. In the same 
period, tertiary spending over GDP in Italy has remained below 1%. To interpret this 
impressive divarication using a political economy key, firstly, notice that in 2010 
the index of intergenerational persistence in education was lower in Portugal than 
in Italy (0.40 compared to 0.45). To this respect, note that in all countries included 
in the group of low spenders (group 3), the children’s level of education is highly 
correlated to the parents’ education level. In our interpretation, this factor reduces 
the demand for advanced education from low-educated households. Since the piv-
otal voter is likely to belong to this majoritarian group, a high education spending 
equilibrium cannot emerge. In turn, this prevents the share of graduates in the adult 
population from growing, and this increases the probability to remain stuck in a low 
education spending equilibrium. Unlike other examples,36 the 2006 Italian reform 
35  "Population with tertiary education" (indicator), https:// doi. org/ 10. 1787/ 0b8f9 0e9- en (accessed on 26 
January 2021).
36 Garrouste (2010) reports a detailed list of reforms on the duration of compulsory education in 15 
European countries plus Israel, during the twentieth century. Although all the countries considered report 
higher educational attainment levels than the compulsory education duration, the two do not seem to 
be correlated. For example, Italy and Denmark, have had similar average compulsory years of educa-
tion (around 5.5 years over the century), but actual duration is 8.2 and 12.3 years, on average, in Italy 
and Denmark respectively. This suggests that, alongside education reforms, other factors, such as the 
demand for skilled workers in time of changes of the industry sectoral composition, have contributed to 
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that has raised mandatory education to 10 years does not seem to have been effec-
tive in increasing education expenditures, particularly for tertiary education, nor the 
number of graduates.37 In our opinion what is needed is a radical reform of second-
ary education, which should reduce early tracking and school segregation by neigh-
borhood and by school programs, emphasising comprehensiveness as opposed to 
vocational orientation.
5  Concluding Remarks
This paper documents differences in education systems across OECD arguing that 
the education system observed in a country is the result of a complex interaction 
between preferences for education and political competition, both of which depend 
on the characteristics of the underlying conflict of interest. To analyse this issue, we 
build a model that emphasises the role of households’ income and education hetero-
geneity. It also relates households’ preferences to country-level characteristics such 
as income inequality and intergenerational persistence in education. Based on our 
model’s results and on the empirical evidence presented, the main policy message 
of our analysis is that the call for an increase of public education expenditures to 
favour equality of opportunities, might not receive political support. Although low 
social status households are the segment of population that should strive more to 
increase equality of opportunities, they might oppose an increase in the level of 
education expenditure, especially at tertiary level. This position might obtain the 
political support of the richer segment of population interested in reducing the pub-
lic budget in favour of private expenditures. The likelihood of this event is greater 
in countries where the share of population with tertiary education is low and the 
intergenerational persistence in education is high, like in Italy. The great dependence 
of the access to tertiary education on parental social status prevents the majority 
of low-educated agents from supporting an increase in public education spending, 
especially at tertiary level. In this respect, reforms of the education system, directed 
at promoting equity and inclusiveness in education and thus at lowering the degree 
of intergenerational persistence in education, are needed.
the increase in the number of years of education. For a successful story about the effects of a compulsory 
education reform on educational attainment and returns to education, see Aakvik et  al. (2010) on the 
1960s reform in Norway. This reform has contributed to moving the country from the bottom to the high-
end of the distribution of education among OECD countries.
Footnote 36 (continued)
37 Our model does not consider the population age structure, which is likely to be an important factor 
affecting support for education. In fact, a population with a high share of young is more likely to sup-
port education spending as opposed to an old population, which is more likely to support other social 
expenditures such as health and pension. This is, of course, one important difference between Italy and 
Portugal. In 2010, in Portugal the ratio of elderly to young was 1.22 while in Italy was 1.45, compared to 
an OECD average smaller than one (https:// data. oecd. org/ pop/ popul ation. htm).
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Appendix 1
See Table 2.
Appendix 2
To find the family optimal choices of consumption and private investment in basic 
and tertiary education, write the family (expected) utility function:
This utility function is maximised under the family budget constraint and the 
non-negativity constraints:
The first order conditions are:
If Tij > 0 condition (6) holds with equality: the marginal utility loss from reduced 
consumption is equal to the marginal utility gain from increased child’s income. If 
condition (6) holds as inequality, then we have a corner solution in which Tij = 0 . 
The family would reduce Tij because T  provides enough education for the child.
In case of an interior solution ( Tij > 0 ), it can easily be shown that the optimal 
choice is:
Note that, while c∗
ij
 is always positive, an interior solution with T∗
ij
> 0 requires 
income to be greater than a threshold value; namely, Yj > g(𝜏, T) =
T
𝛾pi(1−𝜏)
To derive preferences for public education, write the family indirect utility as a 
function of Government’s choice variables
EUij = lncij + 
{
pi ln
[
B
(
Tij + T
)]
+
(
1 − pi
)
lnB
}
= lncij + lnB + piln
(
Tij + T
)
= lncij + lnB + piln
(
Tij + T
)
cij + Tij = (1 − )Yj
Tij, cij ≥ 0
(6)
EUij
Tij
=
−1
cij
+
pi
Tij + T
≤ 0
Tij ≥ 0,
EUij
Tij
Tij = 0
T∗
ij
=
pi(1 − )Yj − T
1 + pi
(7)c∗ij =
(1 − )Yj + T
1 + pi
(8)Wij(,B, T) = lnc∗ij + lnB + piln
(
T∗
ij
+ T
)
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Given its budget constraint, the Government can choose only two variables. Sub-
stituting  B = Y − T   and the optimal choices ( c∗
ij
, T∗
ij
) from (7), the family indirect 
utility becomes
The net benefits from public education expenditures are:
It can be easily verified that (9) and (10) are simultaneously equal to zero only if 
Yj = Y  . In this case, policy preferences are:
If Yj > Y  then the derivative 
Wij
T
 in (10) is always negative and policy preferences 
are
In this equilibrium, there is no public tertiary education and families are willing 
to invest privately T∗
ij
=
pi(1−)Yj
1+pi
 in tertiary education (cfr. 7).38 Note that if there 
exists a private university but the fee is higher than this value, then children from 
poor and less educated families will not be able to access tertiary education.
In case of a corner solution ( T∗
ij
= 0),39 the family indirect utility is
The FOC with respect to the policy variables are:
Wij(, T) = ln
[
(1 − )Yj + T
1 + pi
]
+ ln(Y − T) + piln
[
pi
[
(1 − )Yj + T
]
1 + pi
]
(9)
Wij

= −
(
1 + pi
)
Yj
(1 − )Yj + T
+
Y
Y − T
(10)
Wij
T
=
(
1 + pi
)
(1 − )Yj + T
−

Y − T
(11)T∗ =
(
∗ −

pi +  + 1∕
)
Y
T∗ = 0 and ∗ =

pi +  + 1∕
Wij(, T) = ln
[
(1 − )Yj
]
+ ln[Y − T] + pilnT
(12)
Wij

= −
Yj
(1 − )Yj
+
Y
Y − T
= 0
38 Note that in this equilibrium, the threshold value g(,T) = 0 so that T∗
ij
> 0 for all families.
39 Which requires Yj < g(𝜏,T) =
T
𝛾pi(1−𝜏)
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In this case, policy preferences are:
Note that these preferences also satisfy (11) and the income threshold value is 
exactly equal to average income: g(, T) = Y .
In this equilibrium, poor families (i.e. those with Yj < Y  ) will not invest in private 
education while rich families will spend T∗
ij
=
pi(Yj−Y)
(pi++
1

)(1+pi)
Finally, note that if there is no supply of private (tertiary) education (i.e. 
T∗
ij
= 0 for all) preferences are as in (14) for all families, independently of income.
Appendix 3
See Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6.
(13)
Wij
T
=
pi
T
−

Y − T
= 0
(14)T∗ =
pi
pi +  + 1∕
Y and ∗ =
pi + 
pi +  + 1∕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Table 3  Income inequality, 
education persistence, and share 
of graduates, OECD countries 
(Source: OECD- http:// stats. 
oecd. org/ and GDIM, 2018)
a Data for Chile, Japan and New Zealand refer to 2009.
b Data for Chile refer to 2011.
Country Gini net disposable 
income  2010a
COR Share of 
graduates 
 2010b
Australia 0.33 0.25 37.60
Austria 0.28 0.46 27.74
Belgium 0.27 0.49 34.99
Canada 0.32 0.32 50.31
Chile 0.51 0.51 17.81
Czech Republic 0.26 0.38 16.76
Denmark 0.25 0.17 33.26
Estonia 0.32 0.32 35.42
Finland 0.27 0.30 38.15
France 0.30 0.39 29.01
Germany 0.29 0.32 26.61
Greece 0.34 0.49 24.74
Hungary 0.27 0.63 20.12
Iceland 0.25 0.38 32.63
Israel 0.38 0.40 45.56
Italy 0.33 0.45 14.80
Japan 0.34 0.31 44.81
Korea 0.31 – 39.04
Latvia 0.36 0.38 26.95
Lithuania 0.34 0.39 32.44
Mexico 0.47 0.50 14.65
The Netherlands 0.28 0.38 32.39
New Zealand 0.32 0.21 34.80
Norway 0.25 0.28 37.28
Poland 0.31 0.45 22.47
Portugal 0.35 0.40 15.45
Slovak Republic 0.26 0.42 17.33
Slovenia 0.25 0.31 23.72
Spain 0.34 0.43 31.02
Sweden 0.27 0.39 33.87
Turkey 0.42 0.51 13.12
UK 0.35 0.27 38.19
USA 0.38 0.41 41.66
OECD average 0.38 0.32 29.84
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Table 4  Standardized variables used for cluster analysis
Variables Description
COR Pearson’s correlation coefficient between parents and children 
years of education for the cohort 1980
GINI Gini net disposable income (2010)
SHARE Share of population 25–64 with tertiary education (2010)
TotPub Public expenditure % GDP (average 2010–17)
TotPriv Private expenditure % GDP (average 2010–17)
BasPub Public K-12 education expenditure % GDP (average 2010–17)
TerPub Tertiary public education expenditure % GDP (average 2010–17)
Country COR GINI SHARE BasPub TotPriv TotPub TerPub
AUS − 1.37612 0.1567288 0.781749 0.1311994 1.603995 − 0.2421651 − 0.8679885
AUT 0.7744676 − 0.6514034 − 0.2114783 − 0.4178202 − 0.9335611 0.4248313 1.887899
BEL 1.081694 − 0.8130296 0.5188362 1.406863 − 0.7852623 1.310118 0.649298
CAN − 0.6592575 − 0.0048979 2.062066 0.0827566 1.208532 0.4369588 0.9279834
CHL 1.286512 3.066004 − 1.211757 − 0.8215112 2.510265 − 0.969798 − 0.8989534
CZE − 0.0448039 − 0.9746564 − 1.317527 − 1.322088 − 0.5380979 − 1.212342 − 0.5583383
DNK − 2.195391 − 1.136283 0.3445678 1.762112 − 1.015949 2.025624 1.795004
EST − 0.6592575 − 0.0048979 0.562151 − 0.4016726 − 0.6699189 − 0.1330206 0.4325427
FIN − 0.8640752 − 0.8130296 0.8371525 1.003172 − 1.164248 1.528408 2.011759
FRA 0.0576049 − 0.3281504 − 0.0835473 0.3088237 − 0.2744556 0.3763225 0.3706127
DEU − 0.6592575 − 0.4897771 − 0.3253065 − 0.9022493 − 0.3733215 − 0.6787449 − 0.0009677
GRC 1.081694 0.3183551 − 0.5136773 − 0.9991351 − 0.80174 − 1.188088 − 1.053779
HUN 2.515419 − 0.8130296 − 0.9790637 − 1.031431 − 0.3403661 − 1.139579 − 0.8989534
ISL − 0.0448039 − 1.136283 0.2811062 1.697521 − 0.8841282 1.3465 0.2157876
ISR 0.160014 0.9648606 1.583584 1.148501 0.5988591 0.6431215 − 0.5893033
ITA 0.6720585 0.1567288 − 1.514963 − 0.7246255 − 0.5875307 − 1.066816 − 1.301499
JPN − 0.7616664 0.3183551 1.508034 − 1.112169 0.6153367 − 1.515523 − 1.735009
LVA − 0.0448039 0.6416081 − 0.2910573 − 0.3370821 − 0.5380979 − 0.4847097 − 0.5583383
LTU 0.0576049 0.3183551 0.2619667 − 1.031431 − 0.5216202 − 0.7029994 0.1538577
MEX 1.184103 2.419498 − 1.530073 − 0.1917531 0.3846498 − 0.2664195 − 0.3106179
NLD − 0.0448039 − 0.6514034 0.2569302 − 0.1271626 0.2363511 0.0488877 0.3706127
NZL − 1.785756 − 0.0048979 0.4996967 1.116206 1.472174 0.7280116 − 0.2796529
NOR − 1.068893 − 1.136283 0.7495145 2.262688 − 1.180726 2.437949 1.887899
POL 0.6720585 − 0.1665242 − 0.7423413 − 0.3370821 − 0.4557097 − 0.278547 − 0.0628977
PRT 0.160014 0.4799814 − 1.449487 0.5025952 0.2198735 0.0610152 − 0.8060585
SVK 0.3648317 − 0.9746564 − 1.260109 − 1.273645 − 0.4062767 − 1.236597 − 0.7131633
SVN − 0.7616664 − 1.136283 − 0.616425 − 0.1110149 − 0.5380979 − 0.1815294 − 0.2486879
ESP 0.4672408 0.3183551 0.118926 − 0.8376589 − 0.1426345 − 0.78789 − 0.4035131
SWE 0.0576049 − 0.8130296 0.4060149 0.7771052 − 1.048905 1.043319 1.206668
TUR 1.286512 1.611366 − 1.684195 − 1.209055 0.7636355 − 0.5696001 0.897018
UK − 1.171302 0.4799814 0.8411815 0.9062862 1.653428 0.242923 − 1.332464
USA 0.2624229 0.9648606 1.190725 0.0827566 1.933548 0.0003789 − 0.1867579
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Table 5  Principal components analysis
Principal components/correlation
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)
Number of obs = 32 
Number of comp. = 7 
Trace = 7
Rho = 1.0000
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 3.427 1.790 0.490 0.490
Comp2 1.637 0.755 0.234 0.723
Comp3 0.881 0.421 0.126 0.849
Comp4 0.461 0.061 0.066 0.915
Comp5 0.399 0.204 0.057 0.972
Comp6 0.195 0.195 0.028 1.000
Comp7 0.000 0.000 1.000
Principal components (eigenvectors)
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Comp7 Unexplained
COR − 0.341 − 0.324 0.504 0.320 0.613 0.217 − 0.002 0
GINI − 0.335 0.407 0.532 0.038 − 0.206 − 0.628 − 0.001 0
SHARE 0.318 0.436 − 0.284 0.673 0.363 − 0.206 0.002 0
BasPub 0.459 0.195 0.275 − 0.446 0.381 − 0.038 0.575 0
TotPriv − 0.216 0.667 0.127 − 0.003 − 0.116 0.693 0.006 0
TotPub 0.502 0.065 0.361 − 0.153 0.078 0.047 − 0.763 0
TerPub 0.401 − 0.228 0.400 0.469 − 0.534 0.181 0.296 0
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Table 6  Principal components scores (eigenvectors)
Country Principal component 1 Principal component 2 Principal component 3
AUS − 0.0790023 2.136775 − 1.039097
AUT 0.8751124 − 1.700445 0.7733784
BEL 1.808449 − 0.7514656 0.9797335
CAN 1.26166 1.759033 − 0.2257165
CHL − 3.589872 1.950254 1.971454
CZE − 1.394615 − 1.508195 − 1.262956
DNK 4.008809 − 0.1943855 − 0.0056222
EST 0.4830214 − 0.1653011 − 0.5752124
FIN 3.125973 − 0.6103513 0.3746443
FRA 0.6115296 − 0.3587786 0.2038678
DEU − 0.380898 − 0.5830109 − 1.047917
GRC − 1.931008 − 1.002643 − 0.3800407
HUN − 2.222694 − 1.854415 0.009943
ISL 2.222517 − 0.5276279 0.2172804
ISR 0.6257896 1.835113 0.5136931
ITA − 2.015072 − 1.110116 − 0.3397481
JPN − 1.455485 1.531802 − 2.124409
LVA − 0.7838129 − 0.1732376 − 0.1736651
LTU − 0.6823643 − 0.3963512 − 0.4308769
MEX − 2.106028 0.2031175 2.063992
NLD 0.3865005 − 0.0728434 − 0.2869838
NZL 1.227998 2.115291 − 0.4106906
NOR 4.263002 − 0.3893873 0.7493436
POL − 0.6206887 − 0.9707397 0.1748357
PRT − 0.7721975 − 0.047739 0.5980154
SVK − 1.596566 − 1.484835 − 1.113656
SVN 0.3234753 − 0.8023849 − 1.079177
ESP − 1.126679 − 0.1793219 − 0.3364331
SWE 1.979399 − 0.9120117 0.4164263
TUR − 2.139705 − 0.4623404 1.878165
UK 0.1656726 2.547702 − 0.575036
USA − 0.4722215 2.178839 0.4824639
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